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I. Introduction
At the request of Japanese government, Japanese firms have recently begun
to increasemandatory retirement ages beyond the traditional age of
fifty-five.1 Japanese business firms and other institutionsare required by
law to have 6.9 percent of their total employment to be comprised of in-
dividuals, 55 and over.2
As Japan is becoming an "aging society"a more comprehensive social
security retirement system is necessary. The provision of such a system al—
leviates the financial problems of the elderly and is likely to encourage
elderly workers to leave the labor marketearlier, possiblyimposing a rela-
tively higher tax burden on working generations. Yet job vacancies due to the
earlier retirement of the elderly may provide job opportunities for younger
working generations.
Despite its social—and—economic-policy importance in Japan, few theoreti—
cal and empirical studies have explored theeffectsof social security retire-
ment benefits on the retirement behavior of elderly male workers, with the
exception oftherecent studies by Takayama (1982) and Ito(1983) .However,
these two studies do not specifically focus on the relationship between social
securityretirementbenefits and theretirementdecisions of the elderly inan
econometricmultivariate analysis. Consequently, the quantitative impact of
the socia.l—security—retjrenrent—benefj teffectontheretirement decisions is
riotwelldocumented.'
The purpose of thisstudy isto analyze the retirement deci sions of
elderly mal e workers iii thecontextof mul tivar late ant lysisWe hypothesize
—1--that the responses of retirement decisions to soda—economic factors differ by
age. We consider the age groups 60—64, 65-69, and 70 and over. 8y further
separating each age group according to their degree of labor attachment, e.g.,
full—time work, part—time work, unemployment, and retirement, we examine the
transitional aspects of the retirement decisions of elderly male workers. This
sort of application should not be underestimated for two reasons: first,
understanding the effect of social security retirement benefits on the retire-
ment decisions of the elderly is valuable and crucial in determining social
and economic policy. Secondly, an evaluation of the quantitative effects rests
on empirical studies such as ours.
The organization of the subsequent sections is as follows. Section II
contains a brief review of the Welfare Pension in Japan. InSectionIII we
describeour theoretical model. We present the the empirical results in Sec-
tionIVand state our conclusions in Section V.
-2-II. A Brief Review of the Welfare Pension
In Japan, the social security program (Welfare Pension) was introduced in
1942. The Welfare Pension covering a majority of Japanese workers is a par-
tially funded system, not a pay—as—you-go system.4 Under the Welfare Pension a
flat tax rate of 10.6% is applied to monthly labor earnings up to a maximum of
410 thousand yen from a minimum of 45 thousand yen for male workers. The rate
is 8.9% for female workers.5 Half of the social security tax rate is paid by
the employer, as is true with the U.S. social security system.
Retirement benefits of the Japanese Welfare Pension (social security
retirement benefits, SSRB) are indexed to the inflation rate and generally
require 20 year minimum contributions. The normal retirement age is 60 for men
and 55 for women.6 The basic schedule of monthly social security retirement
benefits for a typical individual 'i' is given as follows (Japan, White Paper
of Welfare l983):
SSRB. =2,050 x T{T=20 if T.￿ 20; T=T. if 20 <T.<35;
and T35lf Ti? 35} ÷ N W/12 T.)
x (1/100) x LI, (1)
where T. =numberof preretirement working years, and W. =monthlylabor
earnings in time t. The payment of monthly social security retirement benefits
is reduced according to the amount of an individual's monthly labor earnings
as shown in Table 1. Table 1 provides the schedule of the payments.
[Table 1 should be here]
As we note from the above schedule, the current system of social security
retirement benefits in Japan has only an income effect for the elderly in the
age categories of 60—64 and 65 and over. In Figure 1, we have drawn illustra-
tive monthly budget constraints for the elderly in both age groups.
[Figure 1 should be here]
The distance OA indicates the amount of monthly social security retirement
—3—benefits, assuming no other non—labor income, for individuals working zero
hours a month (the benefits and wage rates are assumed to be the same for both
age groups) .Thesaw shaped budget line ABFGHIJ Is the schedule for the el-
derly in the 60-64 age category, whereas the budget line ABCDE is for those in
On the other hand, the elderly in the age category of 65 and over face a
minimal social security retirement benefits reduction. The reduction is only
20 percent of the benefits when their labor earnings exceed 150 thousand yen.
That is, in the transition from the 60—64 age group to another age group of 65
and over the elderly will experience a strong income effect from social
security retirement benefits (i.e., from budget constraint ABFGHIJ to ABCDE in
Figure 1), resulting in a reduction either in their working hours or their
labor force participation.
In this study, we focus on the labor force participation of three dif-
ferent age groups of elderly men: ages 60—64. 65—69, and70andover.Further-
more, amongeach age group we separate the degree of labor involvement by
classifyingfull—time work, part—time work, unemployment, arid retirement.An
advantage of using the labor force participation rates of the elderly and
—4—
the 65 and over age category.
Noting that the income level at F (in Figure 1) is more than that at 0
and H, the elderly in the 60—64 age category are likely to work either rela-
tively few hours (less than or equal to T1 hours or T2 hours) a month while
receiving at least eighty percent of their social security retirement benefits
or a substantially larger number of hours (more than T4 hours) with zero
social security retirement benefits.8 This budget constraint results from a
lump—sum reduction in social security retirement benefits according to their
labor earnings, rather than a proportional reduction of labor earnings from
social security retirement benefits as with the United States social security
system.classifying each by labor attachment is that we are able to examine the tran-
sitional aspects of their labor retirement decisions.
—3-III. Empirical Model and Theoretical Arguments
The percentage of full—time male workers among the total number of el-
derly male workers diminishes with age as follows: 85.0 percent among those
aged 55 to 59, 71.0 percent among those aged 60 to 64, and 61.0 percent among
those aged 65 to 69, in 1980 (White Paper of Labor, l983). On the other hand,
the corresponding percentages of part—time workers rises with age, 14.7 per-
cent, 28.7 percent, and 38.7 percent for those aged 55 to 59, 60 to 64. and 65
to 69, respectively. These rates illustrate the transitional aspect of working
decisions. A similar pattern is also observed In U.S. studies (Gustman and
Steinmeier 1983 and 1984; Honig and Hanock 1985), Thus, we separate full—time
work, part—time work, unemployment, and retirement for each of the three age
groups: 60—64, 65—69, and 70 and over.10
The variables in our model are cross—sectional market averages primarily
drawn from the 1980 Population Census of .Japan. Our approach assumes that a
typical elderly man faces four mutually exclusive alternatives with the cor-
responding probabilities P1. P2, F3, and P4, which represent the probabilities
that the man chooses full-time work, part-time work, unemployment, or retire-
ment, respectively. By definition, the sum of the probabilities is equal to




(2) p4 =[1/(1± .exp(a.+E.(B..X.)))],
where the X, j=l in, are the independent variables.
By solving for the log-odds ratio of the 1th type of participation deci—
sion (P. relative to P4), the logistic equation canbeexpressed in the linear
form:
—6--(3) ln(P./P4) =a.+L(B.X) 1=1,2, and 3.










In our model, the are unobserved and constrained to the interval from
zero to one. For the estimation of equation (3), we substitute Pf (the propor-
tion of elderly men in a given age group who are full—time participants in the
labor market) for P1; P (the proportion of those men who are part-time par-
ticipants) for P2 Pu (the proportion of unemployed elderly men in the age
group) for P3; and P (the proportion of those men who are retired) for P4.
Each equation will be estimated using generalized least squares so as to
correct for heteroscedasticity. The weights to be used are given by:
(6) W1 =[(totalmale population in a given age group)P.P]½, i=f,p, and u.
This study employs the following explanatory variables: social security
retirement benefits, full—time male wages, part—time male wages, unemployment,
family wealth, education, presence of spouse, family structure, and hea]th
condition. The variables are defined in Table 2 and their statistics are
reported in Table 3. We briefly discuss the explanatory variables of interest.
[Tables 2 and 3 should be herej
The availability of social security retirement benefits (SSRB) will
discourage the labor force participation of the elderly due to its income
effect, as discussed in Section 1112 An increase in either full—time or part—
time wages is likely to influence the elderly to substitute between full-time
and part—time work, after considering the effect on social security retirement
benefits. We use two proxy variables for family wealth: the sum of income
flows from assets such as housing, land, stocks, and bonds; and personal
savings. Their effects on the retirement decisions of the elderly will be
—7--different because their liquidity differs.
Elderly men, with spouse present, are likely to be integrated into their
communities as workers and/or to have financial responsibility. We expect the
presence of a spouse to a positive effect on labor force participation. The
family structure variable is the proportion of elderly living with their
children and grandchildren. Elderly livingwiththeirchildrenand
grandchildren seem to have income effect against labor force participation due
to other members' earnings. Finally, the health condition of the elderly
cannot be ignored. Health improvement positively affects their work efforts
(Rones 1980; Fuchs 1984). Noise, population density and heavy traffic may
cause tension to rise and consequently to have an adverse effect on an
individual's health condition (Gerking and Schulze 1981; Cropper 1981). Life—
sty]e health habits, e.g., cigarette smoking and diet, will also influence
health quality (Rosen 1981; Wolfe 1984).
—8—IV. Empirical Results
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the results obtained from our estimation model
for three age groups: 60-64, 65—69, and 70 and over, respectively.
[Tables 4, 5 and 6 should be here]
One notable finding is that the estimated coefficients on the social
security retirement benefits variable (SSRB) are statistically significant and
negative in the full-time and part-time equations for all age groups. The
estimated elasticity of the probability of retirement with respect to social
security retirement benefits, evaluated at the sample means, is 1.29 for
elderly men in the 60—64 age category.13 The retirement elasticities for the
elderly in the age categories of 65—69 and 70 and over are .57 and .08,
respectively. An increase in social security retirement benefits induces
earlier retirement of elder'y men.
The declining elasticity of retirement with respect to social security
retirement benefits with age is composed of the following factors:
(1) the proportion of retirement (R) rises from .211 (60—64), to .377 (65—
69) and .675 (70 and over) as ages advance;
(2) the ratio of full—time work to retirement (F/R) decreases from 3.35
(60—64) to 1.29 (65-69), and .34 (70 and over); and
(3) the full—time elasticities with respect to social security retirement
benefits (6lnF/O1nSSRB )are—.40 (60—64), —.39 (65—69), and -.19
(70 and over). A one percent increase in social security retirement
benefits wi1l lead to a .4 percent decrease in full—time labor force
participation among the age groups 60-64 and 65—69, and a .19
percent reduction among the age group of 70 and over.
In comparison to the elasticity of full—time work with respect to social
security retirement benefits, the part—time elasticity is much smaller and
invariant with age: -01 (60-64), -.02 (65-69), -.01 (70 and over). These
—9—results indicate that the earnings test in Japan is more effective on full—
14
time workers than part—time workers among the elderly.
The positive effect of social security retirement benefits on unemploy-
ment for all age groups (column 3 in Tables 4,5 and 6) show that the
eligibility for both unemployment Insurance benefits and social security
retirement benefits provides the elderly with an incentive to prolong their
unemployment status and, hence, the unemployed elderly maximize their entitled
benefits,15 This finding Is congruent with the report of Ito (1983).
Another noteworthy finding is that retirement among the elderly is a
consequence of their difficulty of finding jobs In Japan. In Tables 4,5 and
6, the effects of the market unemployment rate on full—time work and part—time
work are significantly negative for all age groups. A decrease in the prob-
ability of labor force participation in full-time work and part—time work due
to an increase in the unemployment rate represents the discouragement effect.
The marginal effects of the market unemployment rate on full—time work are
much greater than those on part—time work for all age groups.16 A one percent-
age point increase in the unemployment rate reduces full—time-work labor force
participation by 4.1 percentage points (60—64), 4.0 percentage points (65—69),
and 3.0 percentage points (70 and over). The reductions in the labor force
participation rates for part—time work are .01 percentage points (60—64),.08
percentage points (65—69), and .02 percentage points (70 and over).
The elasticity of retirement with respect to the market unemployntent rate
(the discouragement effect) is .40 (60—64), .26 (65—69), and .12 (70 and over)
at the sample means. In comparison with the estimated elasticity of retirement
with respect to social security retirement benefits (the induced retirement
effect) of 1.29 (60—64), .57 (65—69), and .08 (70 and over),the induced
retirement effect is larger iiimagnitudethan the discouragement effect,
exceptforthe elderly in the70 and over age category. Yet,the statistically
—10—significant discouragement effect indicates that the elderly face the dilemma
of discouragement from searching unsuccessfully for jobs and the consequent
stigma of unemployment. Dwindling job opportunities for the elderly during a
period of high market unemployment persuade them to exit the job market.
The estimated coefficients on the presence of a spouse variable in the
full-time work equation are statistically significant and poitive for all age
groups. Financial responsibility for the spouse is likely one of the reasons.
With respect to family structure, the elderly living with their children and
grandchildren tend to reduce their full—time work activity. However, the
positive effect on part-time work among all age groups suggests that the
family structure does not necessarily force the elderly to leave the labor
market completely, but lets them stay at the intermediate state as part-time
workers before retirement.
To represent health conditions, we included tension and life expectancy
variables. The former is measured by public nuisance complaints (noise pollu-
tion) received by local public bodies. For the latter, the predicted value of
life expectancy is used: the instrumental variables are medical care, daily
diet of salty paste, cigarette smoking, nutrition guidance, education, inspec-
tive facilities of food and enviroment sanitation, and air pollution. The
tension variable has negative effects on full-time work, part-time work and
unemployment for all age groups. That is, a rise in teision reduces the work
effort of the elderly, shortens their labor market activities and consequently
compels the elderly to withdraw from the labor market, namely to rtire. The
effects of the life expectancy variables are weak, though some of them are
statistically significant and positive.
—11—V. Conclusion
The Japanese Goverment recently requested private firms and public or—
ganizations to extend mandatory retirement ages beyond the traditional age of
fifty-five. To implement proper socioeconomic and health—related policy ac-
tion, we consider it indispensable to understand the underlying factors in-
fluencing the retirement decisions of the elderly. We examined the effect of
social security retirement benefits on the retirement decisions of elderly
male workers in different age groups (60-64, 65—64, and 70 and over) with
full—time work, part—time work, unemployment, and retirement separately
studied for each. The variables in our model are cross—sectional market
averages primarily drawn from the 1980 Population Census of Japan.
The major findings in this study are that retirement decisions are mainly
determined by social security retirement benefits and the market unemployment
rate. An increase in social security retirement benefits induces the elderly
to leave the labor market when they become eligible for the benefits (i.e. the
induced retirement effect). Retirement among the elderly is also a consequence
of their difficulty in finding jobs (i.e. the discouragement effect). The
induced retirement effect dominates the discouragement effect.
The estimated elasticity of the probability of retirement with respect to
social security retirement benefits declines as ages advance. The negative
impact of social security retirement benefits on full—time workers is much
greater than on part—time workers for all age groups. Earnings test in Japan
is,therefore, more effective oii full—time workers than part—time workers
among the elderly. Social security retirement benefits also provide the el—
deny with anincentive toprolong their unemploymed status. The marginal
effectof the market unemployment rate on full—timework is significantly
largerthan that onpart—time work and both effects are negative. The elas—
—12-ticity of retirement with respect to the market unemployment rate for those in
their 60's is two to three times larger than for those ages 70 and over.
Retirement of those in their 60s Is also quite responsive to changes in labor
market conditions.
Among the other variables in our model, we found that elderly men with a
spouse are strongly attached to the full—time labor market, indicating their
integration into communities and financial responsibility. When living with
their children and grandchildren, the elderly tend to reduce their full-time
work activity but stay at the intermediate state, working part time before
complete retirement.
As a concluding remark, the retirement nf the elderly is attributable
mainly to social security retirement benefits and dwindling job opportunities.
To advance the understanding of socioeconomic activities of the elderly, more
studies of this type are encouraged in Japan.
-13-FOOTNOTES
*We are indebted to Michael Grossman, Koichi Hamada, Marjorie Honig,
Robert A. Moffitt and Bernard Okun for their helpful comments on preliminary
drafts of this paper. The opinions expressed in this paper, as well as any
errors, are ours.
1. In 1980,
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—14—
the business firms, which set the mandatory retirement ages
accounted for 39.7 percent of the total business firms. Those
ages between 56 and 59 years old accounted for 20.1 percent
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2 (White Paper of Labor, Showa 58 Nenban (1983), p. 69).
United States, the social security system seems to create a
earlier retirement, though some studies negate the earlier
ects. Boskin (1977), Pellechio (1979), Hurd and Boskin (1984),
and Fields (1984) suggest that social security retirement
a significant influence on the retirement decision and induce
ement. Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1980), and Hanmermesh (1984),
that social security retirement benefits do not present a work
to the elderly under age 65 but rather that the elderly stay
labor market becasue of an increase in deferred retirement5. After April in 1986, the rates were raised to 12.4 percent and 11.3
percent for male and female workers, respectively.
6. After April in 1986, the normal retirement age for female workers was
raised to sixty years old with gradual adjustments.
7. A typical retired male with zero working hours a month, received 136
thousand yen (SSRB) per month in 1983, based on the condition that he, with
spouse present, had worked for 30 years. The replacement rate, proxied by the
ratio of social security retirement benefits to personal disposable income per
capita in real terms, was about 50 percent on the average over the period from
1970 to 1982. This rate is low in comparison to the U.S. standard (Aldrich
1982).
8. According to the Wage Census 1983, a typical male aged between 60 and
64 earned 1,290 yen per hour on at the average full—time job. In Table 1, if a
typical male worker receives labor earnings more than 92 thousand yen but less
than 150 thousand yen a month, his total income (social security retirement
benefits plus his labor earnings) is often smaller than the case in which he
earns labor earnings between 45 thousand and 92 thousand yen. The fact is that
the labor earnings of more than 92 thousand yen but less than 150 thousand yen
result in a 50 or an 80 percent reduction in social security retirement
benefits, while the other income range results in only a 20 percent reduction.
Therefore, it is clear that choosing working hours in the labor income range
of than 92 thousand yen but less than 150 thousand yen is an inferior solution
to maximize total income.
9. The proportion of the elderly in the age category of 70 and over is
not reported.
10. According to the 1980 Population Census of Japan (pp. XI-XXI),
"employed" persons refer to all persons who did any work during the week prior
to the census date for pay or profit, such as wages, salary, allowance, bust—
-15—ness profit, etc. ,aswell as persons who had a job or business but did not
work at all during the week prior to the census date because of vacation,
illness, bad weather, labor dispute, or personal reasons. Unemployed persons
refer to those who had no job but were able to work and were actively seeking
a job during the week prior to the census date. Among employed elderly men,
the two major categories in the Census are "mainly working or mostly worked'
and "secondarily working or working besides doing housework". There are,
however, no classifications for employed elderly men in terms of working hours
or weeks. Therefore, full—time work and part—time work in this paper refer to
"mainly working or mostly worked" and "secondarily working or working besides
doing housework' In the Census, respectively.
11. Japan is administratively divided into forty—seven prefectures, of
which one carries the suffix "To", one carries "Do", two carry "Fu', and
forty—threecarry "Ken".Each prefecture is further subdivided into
"Shi(city)" and "Gun(rural county)". 'Gun" are further subdivided Into
"Cho(town)" and "Mura(village)". In our study, we employ data for urban areas,
referred to as "Shi(cities)". Further insight into the retirement decisions of
Japanese elderly men awaits the availability of individual and logitudinal
data, which, we find after conversations with Professor Yoshio Higuchi, are
inaccessible to reseachers not affiliated with the Japanese Government.
12.In the studies on theUnitedStates, Burtless and Moffitt (1985),
Duggan (1984), Hanoch and Honig (1983), Honi.g and Hanoch (1985),Hurdand
Boskin (1984), and Mitchell and Fields (1984) find social security retirement
benefits to induce earlier retirement.
13. The retirement elasticity is obtained from the following formula:
(dIn R/dlii SSRB) =— [(F/R)(ölnF/O1nSSRB )÷(P/R)( ölnP/ö1nSSRB )+
(U/R)( ólnU/OInSSRB )],
whereR, F, P, and U of theelderly in agiven age category are
—16-average proportions of retirement, full—time work, part-time work,
and unemployment, respectively, and R +F+P+U=1.
14. There are little qualitative and quantitative changes, when social
security retirement benefits are treated endogenous and the predicted va1ues
are used in the model.
15. The stated period of unemployment insurance benefits is 300 days and,
in addition, an extension is allowed from 60 to a maximum of 90 days under
certain conditions. The unemployment benefits are not subject to the reduction
of social security retirement benefits.
16. The marginal effect is obtained from the application of equation (4).
--17—Table 1
Monthly Social Security Retirement Benefits in Yen (as of 1985)
Age Monthly Labor Earnings Monthly SSRB
60 —64 W. 45,000 1 x SSRB(fullamount)
45,000 <W.￿ 92,000 0.8 x SSRB
1
92,000<W.￿ 126,000 0.5 x SSRB
1
126,000<￿150,000 0.2 x SSRB
150,000 <W. 0 x SSRB
1
65and + W. 150,000 1 x SSRB (full amount)
150,000 <W. 0.8 x SSRB
1
Source:Social Insurance Handbook 1983 (1982).
Note.W.i; iudiviWn[ monthlyIahor earnings,whih include
wages anlpaynients in kind.Bonuses arealso included if they are
given four times ormorea year.Totalbenefits are social
security retirementbenefits(SSRB) pius 15,000enx F(F=i if
spouseisalive; and F=0 otherwise) +5,000x N(=min(N.,2))




SSRB ——Theaverage of annual social security retirement benefits
for a retired person, in one thousand yen deflated by the cost of
living in 1980, for all age groups.
Full-time male worker (Pf) —-Theproportion of full-time male
workers aged 60—64, 65—69, and 70 and over In cities In 1980
for age groups 60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over respectively.
Part—time male worker (Pp) ——Theproportion of part—time male
workers aged 60—64, 65—69, and 70 and over in cities In 1980
for age groups 60—64, 65—69, and 70 and over respectively.
Unemployed (Pu) —-Theproportion of unemployed males aged 60—64,
65—69, and 70 and over in cities In 1980 for age groups 60—64,
65—69, and 70 and over respectively.
Retired (Pr) ——Theproportion of retired males aged 60—64, 65—69, and 70
and over in cities in 1980 for age groups 60—64, 65—69, and 70
and over respectively.
Full—time male wage ——Hourlyfull—time male wage aged 60—61, in
one thousand yen deflated by the cost of living in 1980, for age
group 60—64. Hourly full—time male wage aged 65 and over, in one
thousand yen deflated by the cost of living in 1980, is used for
age groups 65—69, and 70 and over.
Part—time male wage ——Hourlypart—time male wage aged 60—64, in
one thousand yen deflated by the cost of living In 1980 for age
group 60—64. Hourly part—time male wage aged 65 and over, in one
thousand yen deflated by the cost of living in 1980, is used for
age groups 65—69, and 70 and over.
MarketUnemployment -—Theproportion of the total labor force aged 15
and over who areunemployed,in cities in 1980 for all age groups.
Non-labor income ——Incomefrom rent,dividends, and
interestfrom bonds, per person in houshoid sector i.n one thousand
yen deflated bythecost of living in1980for all age groups.
Personal savings ——Thebalance of personal savings per person





Education —-Theproportion of males aged 60—64 with at least a
senior high school education in cities in 1980 for age group
60—64. The proportion of males aged 65 and over with at least a
senior high school education in 1980 is used for age groups 65—69,
and 70 and over.
Presence of spouse ——Theproportion of males aged 60-64, 65-69, and
70 and over living with wife, in cities, in 1980, for age groups
60—64, 65—69, and 70 and over respectively.
Family structure ——Theproportion of elderly living with
two or three generations together, in cities, in 1980.
Tension ——Thepercentage change in complaints received by local public
bodies for public nuisances (noise pollution), in 1980.















SSR 1158.01 1157.56 1155.08
(63.093) (62.085) (62.962)
Full—time Male 0.707 0.562 0.293
Worker (Pf) (0.050) (0.056) (0.046)
Part—time Male 0.012 0.018 0.019
Worker (Pp) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Unemployed 0.070 0.043 0.013
(Pu) (0.015) (0.009) (0.004)
Retired (Pr) 0.211 0.377 0.675
(0.040) (0.055) (0.049)
Full—time 0.924 0.840 0.837
MalelVage (0.117) (0.090) (0.090)
Part—tIme 0.571 0.623 0.624
Male Wage (0.063) (0.079) (0.079)
Market 0.027 0.027 0.027
Unemployiiient (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
No—labor 196.088 196.986 196.262
Income (72.843) (72.877) (72.203)
Personal 1752.95 1760.50 1765.83
Savings (319,81) (318.33) (316.76)
Education 0.374 0.310 0.309
(0.094) (0.081) (0.080)
Presence of 0.921 0.897 0.756















Family 0.150 0.150 0.151














Empirical Results of Retirement Model: Age 60—64
Independent le(Pf/Pr) ln(Pp/Pr) ln(Pu/Pr)
variable full—time part—time unemployed
Intercept —15.497 43.521 _48.037**
(16.92) (31.63) (18.72)
SSRB _l.567E_3*** _l.424E_3*** 0.718E_3**
(0.27E-3) (0.50E—3) (0.30E-3)
Full—time male 0.506* _0.941* 0.66l**
wage(60—64) (0.29) (0.53) (0.34)
Part—time male_0.844** 0.152 —0.705
wage(60—64) (0.37) (0.70) (0.44)
Market _20.473*** _15.167*** —0.589
Unemployment (2.84) (5.30) (3.18)
Non—labor I .6l.OE_3*** _2.451E_3** 0.180E—3
income (0.57E-3) (LO8E—3) (0.63E—3)
Personal 0.108E—3 0.345E_3** 0.225E_3**
savings (0.09E—3) (0.lGE—3) (0.1OE—3)
Education 0.191 2.089** —0.404
(60—64) (0.42) (0.77) (0.47)
Presence of 7.007*** —2.784 —2.453
spouse (60—64) (1.45) (3.13) (1.66)
Family 1.349** 2.889** —1.219
structure (0.63) (1.07) (0.75)
Tension _0.264** —0.142 _0.254*
(0.11) (0.19) (0.13)
Life expectancy 2.854 --9.846 ll.181**
(In) (3.92) (7.31) (4.34)
F—statistic 28.08 12.19 12.52
R—squared 0.90 0.79 0.80
StandardErrors are in parentheses. Asterisks represent sig—
nificance levels of logit coefficients as follows: 99%
level, **95%level, and *90%level for a two—tailed test,
A (in) next to a variable mdi rates the natural logarithm of
the variable.
-23-Table 5
Empirical Results of Retirement ModeL 65—69
Independent le(Pf/Pr) in(Pp/Pr) ln(Pu/Pr)
variable full—time part—time Unemployed
Intercept —1.103 22.217 —28.114
(18.16) (32.91) (20.91)
SSRB _l.354E_3*** _l.509E_3** 0.640E_3*
(0.32E—3) (0.57E—3) (0.37E—3)
Full—time male —0.285 —0.151 —0.222
wage(65andover)(0.28) (0.47) (0.36)
Part—time male—0.218 0.282 _0.684**
wage(65 and over)(0.23) (0.44) (0,28)
Market _16.670*** _14.032** 1.211
Unemployment (3.15) (5.84) (3.72)
Non—labor 0.473E—3 —0.160E—2 l.463E_3**
incouc (0.56E—3) (0.1OE—2) (0.62E—3)
Personal 0.254E_3*** 0.423E_3** 0.248E_3**
savings (0.09E—3) (0.16E—3) (0.11E—3)
Education 0.832 0.224 —0.207
(65 and over) (0.56) (1.01) (0.66)
Presence of 3.120*** 3.892*** 2.8l9***
spouse (65—69) (0.56) (0.90) (0.65)
Family —0.775 1.853* _2.521***
structure (0.65) (1.09) (0.83)
Tension _0.236* —0.085 _0.321**
(0.12) (0.20) (0.15)
Life expectancy0.097 —0.387 5.342
(in) (4.24) (7.69) (4.89)
F—statistic 22.78 14.16 15.38
R—squared 0.88 0.82 0.83
Standard Errors are in parentheses. Asterisks represent sig-
nificance levels of logit coefficientsasfollows: 99?
level, **95?6level, and *90?levelfora two—tailed test.
A (In) next: to a var- lab Ic indicates the natural logan turn
the variable.
—24-Table 6
Empirical Results of Retirement Model: 70 and over
Independent le(Pf/Pr) In(Pp/Pr) ln(Pu/Pr)
variable full—time part—time unemployed
Intercept _37743** —28.401 —30.432
(16.38) (34.33) (29.44)
SSRB _0.797E_3** —0.851E—3 1.017E_3*
(0,30E-3) (0.62E—3) (0.55E-3)
Full—time male_0.609** —0.613 0.017
wage(65 and over)(0.24) (0.47) (0.48)
Part—time male—0.216 0.027 _0.755*
wage(65 and over)(0.21) (0.44) (0.38)
Market _14.630*** 14.198** —1.367
Unemployment (2.91) (6.11) (5.36)
Non--labor 0.297E—3 _2.948E.3*** l.413E_3*
income (0.46E—3) (0.95E—3) (O.79E-3)
Personal 0.398E_3*** 0.735E_3*** 0.534E_3***
savings (0.08E—3) (0.16E—3) (0.14E-3)
Education 0.210 0.888 —0.628
(65 and over) (0.49) (0.99) (0.93)
Presence of spo— 3.892*** —3.126 0.087
use(70 and over) (1.16) (2.48) (2.02)
Family —0.931 1.682 _4.633***
structure (0.59) (1.14) (1.21)
Tension 0.l76* -0.010 _0.407**
(0.10) (0,19) (0.19)
Life expectancy8.194** 6.461 5.908
(In) (3.84) (8.40) (6.91)
F—statistic 27.03 12.05 23.17
J-squared 0.90 0.79 0.88
Standard Errors are in parentheses. Asterisks represent sig-
nificance levels oflogitcoefficients as follows: 99%
level, **95level, and*90%level for a two-tailed test.
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